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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The district court entered its memorandum decision and order dismissing all 
claims against all of the parties on December 29, 2011. [Record volume 4, pages 1515-
1541 (hereinafter R. 1515-1547)]. Bates timely filed a notice of appeal on January 23, 
2012. [R. 1548-1551]. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to the Court of 
Appeals. [R. 1555]. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0). 
i 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Appellees Mark Steinegal and Charles Smalley's brief focuses on the following 
two issues (as also stated in the brief of Appellees Utah Association of Realtors and 
Christopher Kyler). 
Issue 1: Whether the district court correctly concluded that, under Jensen v. 
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325, claims that are based on the exact same operative 
facts that would support a defamation claim are subject to Utah's one-year limitations 
period for defamation. 
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure presents a question of law that this Court 
reviews for correctness. Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, f^ 9, 104 
P.3d 1226. Significantly, however, due to the First Amendment interests at stake when 
allegedly defamatory conduct is at issue, this Court applies a unique standard of review 
under which, unlike a normal motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party is not entitled to 
any inferences in his favor. Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, f 18, 212 P.3d 535 ("To 
accommodate the respect we accord its protections of speech, the First Amendment's 
presence merits altering our customary rules of review by denying a nonmoving party the 
benefit of a favorable interpretation of factual inferences.'" (quoting O'Connor v. 
Burningham, 2007 UT 58, f 27, 165 P.3d 1214)). 
vi 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and memoranda [R. 447, 
455], and by oral argument [R. 1560 at 6:18-8:7; 104:23-107:1], and was discussed in the 
district court's final Memorandum Decision and Order. [R. 1523-32]. 
Issue 2: Whether the District Court correctly concluded that petitioning the Utah 
Division of Real Estate for revocation of a real estate broker's license based on allegedly 
sanctionable misconduct constitutes petitioning of a governmental agency within the 
scope of immunity afforded by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. 
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure presents a question of law that this Court 
reviews for correctness. Oakwood Vill LLC, 2004 UT 101, f 9. However, because the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is based on "[t]he First Amendment. . . right to 'petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances, '"Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, f 
26, 116 P.3d 323 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. I), as with Issue 1, this Court should apply 
Utah's unique standard of review for claims implicating First Amendment interests under 
which, unlike a normal motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party is not entitled to any 
inferences in his favor. Jacob, 2009 UT 37, f^ 18. 
Alternatively, if this Court is not inclined to apply the unique standard of review 
set forth in Jacob to Issue 2, this Court "accept[s] the factual allegations in the complaint 
as true and interprets] those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party." Oakwood Vill LLC, 2004 UT 101, 
vii 
I 9. In doing so, however, this Court "need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded." 
Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, H 10, 232 P.3d 999. Nor is this 
Court required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations in the 
complaint. See id.; Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, J^ 60, 
70 P. 3d 17 ("[T]he sufficiency of [the plaintiffs] pleadings must be determined by the 
facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and memoranda [R. 
1116, 1132-36], and by oral argument [R. 1560 at 24:11-43:17], and was discussed in the 
district court's final Memorandum Decision and Order. [R. 1532-40]. 
vm 
DETERMINITATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances. 
Utah Code section 78B-2-302 provides that: 
An action may be brought within one year: 
(4) for libel, slander, false imprisonment, or seduction . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Other Appellees have included a Statement of the Case in their respective briefs. 
While concurring with those Statements, Steinegal and Smalley provide the following 
Statement focused on the claims against them. 
Nature of the case: Bates asserted nine causes of action against Mark Steinegal 
and Charles Smalley (among many other defendants). But all nine claims are based on 
the same defamation-related allegations: Steinegal and/or Smalley made certain 
comments to news media and/or to Bates himself, and instigated or otherwise participated 
in administrative proceedings conducted by the Utah Division of Real Estate to revoke 
Bates' real estate license. 
Course of proceedings: Steinegal and Smalley moved to dismiss Bates' four 
defamation-labeled claims on statute of limitations grounds. [R. 435-445]. Other 
defendants moved to dismiss all nine of Bates' claims on statute of limitation grounds [R. 
446, 1116], and to dismiss the non-defamation labeled claims based on Noerr-Pennington 
immunity. [R. 1116, 1132-1136]. 
Disposition below: After full briefing and a hearing [R. 1560], the district court 
dismissed all of Bates' claims as to all of the defendants. [R. 1515-1541]. The court held 
that the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims barred Bates' four 
defamation-labeled claims and barred the other claims to the extent they relied on the 
same operative facts. [R. 1524-1525]. The court also ruled that Noerr-Pennington 
immunity barred Bates'non-defamation-labeled claims. [R. 1532-1540]. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO STEINEGAL AND SMALLEY 
Although the Complaint1 stretches more than seventy pages and four-hundred 
paragraphs long, relatively few allegations pertain specifically to Steinegal or Smalley. 
Bates was a licensed Utah principal broker and the founder and sole shareholder of 
AllPro Realty Group, Inc. [R. 264 If 19]. By 2007, Bates oversaw more realtor licensees 
than any other broker or entity in Utah. [R. 265 ^ 22]. But things quickly changed just 
one year later: on October 22, 2008, AllPro announced it was going out of business due 
to the collapsing real estate market [R. 276 f 85; R. 278 ]f 120], AllPro agents were 
disputing (the lack or lateness of) their commission payments [R. 275 f^ 125; R. 281 1f 
140; R. 282 ffl| 143-146; R. 368, 1150 at 68-69; Brief of Applt. at 29], and Bates 
ultimately decided to let his Utah broker's license expire at the end of 2008. [R. 275 ^ 
83]. 
The events leading to and surrounding AllPro's collapse prompted an investigation 
by the Utah Division of Real Estate, an arm of the Utah Department of Commerce. 
Smalley was an investigator for the UDRE and Steinegal was UDRE's director at all 
times relevant to Bates' allegations. [R. 3-4 fflf 5, 7; R. 3 1 H 304; R. 1518]. 
1
 The facts are taken from the relevant and sufficiently-pleaded allegations in Bates' 
Second Amended Complaint and other appropriate sources. Miller v. State, 2010 
UT App 25, \ 16, 226 P.3d 743 (citing St. Benedict'sDev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)); see also Franco v. The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ^  26, 21 P.3d 198 (noting that the 
"sufficiency" of the plaintiff s pleadings for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes "must be 
determined by the facts pleaded rather than the conclusions stated" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
2 
After AllPro announced its closing but before Bates let his license expire, Smalley 
served a Notice of Complaint against Bates on November 4, 2008. [R. 277 j^ 93]. Later 
that month, another UDRE employee filed a Petition against Bates with the UDRE. [R. 
277 Tf 94], The Petition alleged that Bates had violated various provisions of Utah Code § 
61-2-11, including misrepresentation, diversion of funds from their intended purpose, 
dishonest dealing and unprofessional conduct. [R. 1538; Brief of Applt. at 29-30]. 
Bates claims that the UDRE "involuntarily renewed" his broker's license in early 
2009 so it could publicly revoke the license through the ongoing UDRE administrative 
proceedings. [R. 276 f 84]. Ultimately, the administrative law judge held that the UDRE 
was entitled to maintain the administrative proceedings despite Bates' lapsed license but 
dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the UDRE could not 
review real estate commission disputes between licensees. Brief of Applt., App. D at 6-
24. 
Despite the economic crash and resulting problems paying AllPro agents' 
commissions, Bates blames AllPro's demise and his departure from Utah on a "well 
synchronized and conveniently timed" "campaign to destroy [his] career and reputation" 
and "drive Bates from the" market. [R. 283 If 149; R. 285 ^ 162]. Bates directs most of 
his allegations against other defendants, claiming one or more of them discriminatorily 
enforced policies to derail a competing real estate listing website (UtahMLS.com) that 
Bates founded [R. 266-273 ^ 28-66], or sent defamatory mailers and/or emails to AllPro 
3 
agents [R. 278-282 fflf 120-143], or expelled him from the Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
without prior notice or justification and terminated his access to its MLS website [R. 273-
275 H^f 67-83], or made various defamatory remarks about him to media outlets. [R. 282 
f 148; R. 286-289 ffl[ 169-187; R. 292 ]f 201]. 
But none of those allegations involve Smalley and Steinegal. Bates alleges only 
that they made various statements to Bates and/or the media and that they were involved 
in the administrative proceedings against him. 
As to the alleged statements, Bates asserts that: 
• On October 27, 2008 "Defendant Smalley stated to Bates that members of 
the UDRE were trying to find a way around current law to punish Bates" 
[R. 276 If 86; see also R. 290 1194; R. 315 1326]; 
• In an October 28, 2008 KSL broadcast and newspaper article, Steinegal 
"stated that any dispute over nonpayment of commissions does not warrant 
disciplinary action by the UDRE" [R. 276 f 87; R. 3111 304; R. 315 1 
326]; 
• Sometime in late October/early November 2008, "Smalley threatened to 
fine [B]ates $100,000 because of the dispute between Bates and former 
AllPro agents, knowing that the UDRE had no grounds for doing so" [R. 
2821146]; 
• After the administrative hearings were dismissed, Steinegal was quoted in a 
March 19, 2009 newspaper saying "The commission said that the division 
doesn't have jurisdiction, even though it believed there were 
misrepresentations and dishonest activity by Bates, because the complaint 
was essentially based on a commission dispute." [R. 278 1118]. 
4 
As to the administrative proceedings, Bates alleges that: 
• On November 3, 2008, Steinegal, Smalley, and "prominent leaders in the 
Utah real estate industry" met "to find a way around Utah law to punish 
Bates" [R. 276 f 90; see also R. 297 f 223; R. 326 t 392], and to implement 
the plan that unspecified "Defendants" had concocted during a previous 
November 1, 2008 meeting where "Defendants discussed and signed a 
petition to bring administrative proceedings against the Plaintiff and expel 
him from Utah real estate associations" [R. 297 \ 222; see also R. 276 fflf 
88-89; R. 326 t 391]; 
• On November 4, 2008 "Smalley filed a Notice of Complaint against Bates" 
[R. 277 f93]; 
• "Defendants in the Utah Division of Real Estate carried out wrongful and 
groundless administrative investigations and proceedings against the 
Plaintiff5 [R. 31 \ \ 303; see also R. 289-290 ffl[ 188, 190, 192; R. 2911 
199; R. 292 1202; R. 294 ffif 212-213; R. 296 f 220; R. 303-304 fflf 252, 
258; R. 311, ffif 303-305; R. 315 fflf 323, 325]; 
• "Steinegal, a member of the Utah Division of Real Estate at times relevant 
herein, allowed administrative proceedings to continue despite his 
admission during a KSL televised interview that the Commission had no 
jurisdiction on any disputes involving the Plaintiff [R. 311 f^ 304; R. 315 ^ 
325] and "Steinegal recused himself from the administrative proceedings 
with knowledge that such actions were groundless, illegal, and anti-
competitive" [R. 3 1 H 305]. 
Bates sued in January 2011. [R. 1]. His live pleading (the Second Amended 
Complaint) alleges nine causes of action against fourteen individuals and entities along 
with sixty unnamed "Does." [R. 261]. His first four claims were all expressly 
defamation based: defamation, defamation per se, conspiracy to defame, and false light. 
[R. 286-304]. Bates' next five claims were all nominally non-defamation causes of 
action: unfair business practices, abuse of process, tortuous interference with contractual 
5 
relations and with economic relations, and conspiracy to destroy trade, business or 
occupation of another. [R. 305-325]. But, at least as to Smalley and Steinegal, these 
seemingly non-defamation claims were still based on the exact same allegations 
underlying the defamation claims. In other words, Bates repeated the same few 
defamation allegations against Smalley and Steinegal over and over in his complaint but 
just renamed them as different causes of action. 
After briefing and a hearing, the district court dismissed the first four defamation 
claims as barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. [R. 1524-1525]. The 
court then dismissed claims five to nine on the same grounds to the extent the claims were 
based on the same allegations underlying Bates' dismissed defamation claims. [R. 1525]. 
In addition, the court ruled that even if Bates' non-defamation-labeled claims were not 
barred by limitations, they were barred by Noerr-Pennington immunity. [R. 1532-1541]. 
Bates then filed this appeal challenging only the dismissal of his non-defamation-
labeled claims. [R. 1548-1549]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In Jensen v. Sawyers, the Utah Supreme Court held that the "statute of limitations 
for defamation governs claims based on the same operative facts that would support a 
defamation action." 2005 UT 81, ^ 53, 130 P.3d 325. The district court therefore 
6 
dismissed all of Bates' nominally non-defamation claims as barred by limitations to the 
extent those claims were based on the same allegations supporting Bates' defamation 
claims. Bates' claims against Steinegal and Smalley unquestionably fall into this 
category. To support his now dismissed defamation claims against Steinegal and 
Smalley, Bates alleged that they made certain statements and that they planned, instigated 
and/or continued UDRE administrative proceedings against him as a statement to the 
public regarding his integrity. Bates' remaining claims against Steinegal and Smalley are 
based on one or more of the exact same defamation allegations. The district court 
properly dismissed all of the claims against Steinegal and Smalley as barred by 
defamation's one-year limitations period. 
Similarly, Bates' claims against Steinegal and Smalley are barred by Noerr-
Pennington immunity. Bates' remaining claims against Smalley and Steinegal are based 
on their involvement in the UDRE administrative proceedings. Noerr-Pennington 
immunity bars suits that are predicated on conduct that constitutes petitioning the 
government. None of Bates' arguments show that Steinegal's and Smalley's alleged 
conduct falls outside the scope oiNeorr-Pennington. In addition, the administrative 
proceedings were not a sham because, as Bates admits, they were genuinely intended to 
achieve favorable government action—revoking Bates' license. 
Steinegal and Smalley also join in and incorporate the arguments presented by the 
other Appellees. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
I. The One-Year Statute of Limitations for Defamation Claims Applies to all of 
Bates' Causes of Action Against Steinegal and Smalley 
Bates does not challenge the district court's dismissal of his four defamation 
claims as time-barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. [R. 1548-
1549]. The Supreme Court has held that this same one-year "statute of limitations for 
defamation [also] governs claims based on the same operative facts that would support a 
defamation action." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, f 53, 130 P.3d 325. Accordingly, 
the district court properly held that Bates' remaining claims—unfair business practices, 
abuse of process, interference with contractual relations and with economic relations, and 
conspiracy to destroy the trade, business or occupation of another—were also barred to 
the extent they "arise from the same operative facts as his four defamation-related 
claims." [R. 1525]. 
The district court's reasoning applies to Bates' claims against Steinegal and 
Smalley, all of which are based on the same allegations and operative facts supporting 
Bates' defamation claims. Specifically, his four defamation causes of action each allege 
one or more of the following: that Smalley told Bates the UDRE was trying to skirt the 
law in order to punish him despite Steinegal's understanding that fee disputes did not 
warrant UDRE disciplinary action [R. 290 ]f 194], "improper" or "groundless 
administrative proceedings" were a statement to the public about Bates' integrity [R. 289-
8 
290 fflf 188, 190, 192; R. 291 ^ 199; R. 292 ^ 202; R. 294 ffi[ 212-213; R. 296 If 220; R. 
303-304 ^[ 252, 258]; and Steinegal and Smalley attended a meeting to carry out a plan to 
bring administrative proceedings against Bates. [R. 297 fflf 222-223]. 
Likewise, Bates' remaining causes of action against Steinegal and Smalley are 
based on those same defamation allegations. Again, Bates claims they carried out 
"improper" and "groundless administrative investigations and proceedings" despite 
Steinegal's admission the UDRE lacked jurisdiction [R. 311, ^ 303-305; R. 315 fflf 323, 
325], Smalley told Bates the UDRE was trying to skirt the law to punish him despite 
knowing that a fee dispute did not warrant disciplinary action [R. 315-316 |^ 326], and 
Steinegal and Smalley attended a meeting to carry out a plan to bring administrative 
proceedings against Bates. [R. 326 ffl[ 391-392]. The one-year statute of limitations 
clearly applies to all of Bates' claims under Jensen. 
Nonetheless, Bates argues on appeal that the district court misinterpreted Jensen, 
which he asserts applies only to false light claims or to defamatory statements, and that 
the district court was legislating from the bench by applying defamation's shorter statute 
of limitations to claims with their own, longer limitations periods. Brief of Applt. at 13-
15. But his attempts to limit Jensen's scope ignore the reasoning and legal precedent that 
compelled the Supreme Court's decision. 
9 
Bates5 argument starts from a false premise: the name of a cause of action dictates 
the applicable statute of limitations. According to Bates, once he cloaked his allegations 
with labels like 'abuse of process' or 'interference with contractual relations' the district 
court had to apply the statute of limitations applicable to those causes of actions. 
But for nearly 100 years the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected Bates' 
premise, emphasizing that the underlying allegations of a claim dictate which statute of 
limitations applies; the labels chosen by the plaintiff are irrelevant. Jensen, 2005 UT 81, 
f 34, 130 P.3d 325 (in determining what statute of limitations applies, the Court "pay[s] 
little heed to the labels placed on a particular claim, favoring instead an evaluation based 
on the essence and substance of the claim."); Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville 
Inv., Inc., 19A P.2d 11,14 (Utah 1990) (whether UCC statute of limitations applied to 
claim "should be decided by the nature of the action and not by the pleading labels 
chosen."); Holm v. B&MServ., Inc., 661 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1983) (reiterating that "the 
name of the [cause of] action can have no effect upon what statute [of limitations] 
controls."); Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden, 112 Utah 436, 440, 188 P.2d 995, 996 (Utah 
1948) (court must look to the nature of the cause of action to determine which statute of 
limitations applies); Reese v. Qualtrough, 48 Utah 23, 156 P. 955, 959 (1916) (holding 
that in deciding what statute of limitations should apply it does not "make any difference 
what the action in which relief is sought is called" and that a plaintiffs attempt to label 
10 
his claim "cannot affect the question of whether one or the other statute of limitations 
should apply," and "the name applied to" a cause of action cannot "change the nature of 
the wrong or the injury."); see also Failor v. Megadyne Med. Prods., Inc., 2009 UT App 
179, \ 12, 213 P.3d 899 ("In characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to the 
nature of the action and not the pleading labels chosen." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 868 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) ("In characterizing a 
cause of action, Utah courts look to the nature of the action and not the pleading labels 
chosen. Accordingly, we are most concerned with the true nature of the wrong and the 
injury as evidenced in the substance of the pleadings."). 
Contrary to Bates' argument, Jensen did not expressly or impliedly overrule 
almost one century of settled law by suddenly restricting the substance-over-labels 
limitations analysis to false light claims. Brief of Applt. at 13-14.2 The limitations 
analysis continues to apply to any and all claims. If anything, Jensen reinforced the 
analysis, explaining why it is especially important to apply to defamation-related 
allegations. 
2
 Further illustrating Bates' misreading of Jensen, he argues that the case "included 
other causes of action, including fraud claims, of which the Court made no mention 
with respect to applying the one-year time bar." Brief of Applt. at 14. In reality, the 
Court did not mention them because they were not at issue. As the Court expressly 
stated: "[o]f the many contentions [the defendants] advanced [in the trial court to 
dismiss the plaintiffs various claims] only one is relevant to this appeal: that the 
one-year statute of limitations for defamation should apply to [plaintiffs] false light 
invasion of privacy claim." Jensen, 2005 UT 81, f^ 21. 
11 
As the Court explained, defamation claims "always reside in the shadow of the 
First Amendment." Jensen, 2005 UT 81, ^ 50. Given its long maturation within the 
common law, however, defamation jurisprudence has "largely found a way to co-exist 
with" the First Amendment's demands by means of various "defenses, privileges, 
heightened burdens of proof, and particularized standards of review." Id. 
The Court noted in particular the role that statutes of limitations play in reconciling 
defamation claims with free-speech rights: 
A shorter limitations period for defamation can be explained and justified as 
an acknowledgment of the importance of the free speech interests with 
which defamation collides. A shorter defamation period reflects the 
importance placed on freedom of speech by restricting the time those 
making statements are exposed to legal challenges, thereby reducing the 
chilling effect on speech that may accompany the prospect of defending 
statements well beyond their shelf lives. 
Id. \ 55. 
Though crucial to protecting free-speech rights, these constraints on defamation 
claims are not necessarily fool proof. Bates' Complaint aptly demonstrates the fear 
expressed in Jensen that "virtually any defamation claim may be recast" as some other 
tort with a potentially longer limitations period, which, if allowed, "would effectively 
neuter the one-year defamation limitation" period. Id. \ 54. Jensen prevents this type of 
artful pleading.3 
3
 Moreover, as Appellee Jillinda Bowers points out, other courts have agreed that 
"the one year statute of limitation for defamation cannot be circumvented by 
12 
Notably, Jensen was not the Court's first effort to extend defamation-specific 
principles to other claims. The Court recognized twenty years ago that where a non-
defamation claim is based on the same facts as a defamation claim, "appropriate concern 
for the First Amendment rights of the parties must be considered." Russell v. Thomson 
Newspapers, Inc. 842 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 1992). Specifically, the Court held that Utah's 
statutory "fair report" privilege, applicable to defamation allegations, also applied to other 
claims such as intentional infliction of emotional distress that are "based on the same 
facts as a claim for defamation." Id. at 906 n.37; see also Jensen, 2005 UT 81, j^ 52 
(explaining the Russell decision). Foreshadowing Jensen, the Russell opinion cited with 
approval cases from other jurisdictions that applied a shorter defamation statute of 
limitations to non-defamation claims "that were tied to defamatory statements." Jensen, 
2005 UT 81, If 52 (citing Russell, 842 P.2d at 906 n.37). 
cloaking such a cause of action in other legal raiment." Evans v. Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., 601 A.2d 330, 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); see also Newcombe v. 
Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1998) (shorter limitations period 
cannot "be circumvented by artful pleading); Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107, 108-
09 (6th Cir. 1978) (shorter defamation limitations period applied to related claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Taylor v. Int'l Union ofElec, Elec, 
Salaried, Mack & Furniture Workers, 968 P.2d 685, 690-92 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) 
(plaintiff "will not be permitted to escape the bar of the statute of limitations by 
calling a defamation action a tortious action for interference with business 
advantage"); id. at 691 (applying same rule to claim of "unfair competition," which 
was really a "business libel action"); cf. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
194 F.3d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1999) (barring claims for breach of duty of loyalty and 
trespass where based on speech as "an end-run around First Amendment strictures"). 
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Considering the foregoing, mutually reinforcing precedent—statutes of limitations 
apply to allegations rather than labels, and First Amendment protections found in 
defamation jurisprudence can extend to other defamation-related claims—the result in 
Jensen was a foregone conclusion. Jensen simply made explicit what controlling 
precedent had already implied: "the statute of limitations for defamation governs claims 
based on the same operative facts that would support a defamation action." Jensen, 2005 
UT 81, f 53. Neither Jensen nor the controlling precedent upon which it relied are 
limited to only false light claims. Rather, the dispositive fact from Jensen remains that 
the plaintiffs claim was based on "the same facts he pleaded under his defamation causes 
of action that were dismissed as untimely." Id. ^ 49; see also id. Iffl 35, 58. 
Consequently, to avoid dismissal of his claims against Steinegal and Smalley, 
Bates has to show that those claims are not "tied to the same operative facts that grounded 
his defamation claims." Id. f 58. But he never does so, nor could he even if he had tried. 
Instead, he asserts generally as to all of the Appellees that his statement of facts show 
"there is much conduct which cannot be related to, or characterized as defamatory 
statements." Brief of Applt. at 14. Bates' statement of facts, however, only mentions 
Smalley and Steinegal in connection with defamatory statements. Bates claims they made 
express statements to him and/or others and that they were involved with the UDRE 
administrative proceedings. Brief of Applt. at 7-8. And Bates' Complaint repeatedly 
14 
characterizes the administrative proceedings as a defamatory statement to the public 
about his integrity. [R. 277 *[j 114 ("Upon information and belief, the renewal of Bates' 
license, and the administrative proceedings brought against him, were to make a 
statement to the public regarding his professional integrity."); R. 289 ^ 188 ("groundless 
administrative proceedings, and complaints made by the Defendants in an attempt to 
begin administrative proceedings made an implicit but clear statement, which was false, 
to the public regarding the Plaintiffs integrity as an individual and integrity and capacity 
as a professional in the community."); R. 290 Tf 192 ("The groundless proceedings were a 
statement by Defendants involved, in instigating and carrying out the investigations and 
the actual proceedings that the Plaintiff was incompetent, unethical and attacked his 
integrity personally and professionally."); R. 318 *| 334 ("Said administrative proceedings 
was [sic] part of an intricate conspiracy against the Plaintiff to remove him from Utah real 
estate industry through the revocation of his license and the public defamation through a 
public administrative proceeding.")]. In short, by Bates' own admission, his only 
allegations against Steinegal and Smalley involve defamatory statements, the same 
statements/conduct upon which he based his dismissed defamation claims. 
Finally, Jensen also refutes Bates' assertion that applying a one-year limitations 
period to all of his claims amounts to legislating from the bench. Brief of Applt. at 14. 
The Court emphasized that "[a]n express one-year statutory limitations period for 
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defamation stands as the implied product of the legislature's consideration of the various 
policy considerations that inform the span of time appropriate to bring an action." 
Jensen, 2005 UT 81, \ 54. Allowing plaintiffs to artfully plead around the limitations 
period, as Bates proposes, would effectively ignore the Legislature's policy 
determinations. Id. 
Moreover, in re-enacting the various statutes of limitations over the years, the 
Legislature is presumed to know about and agree with the judicial decisions applying 
those statutes to a plaintiffs allegations rather than the plaintiffs chosen cause of action 
labels. Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, 139, 158 P.3d 532 ("We presume the Legislature 
is aware of our case law"); Christensen v. Indus. Comm 'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982) 
("where a legislature amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions unamended, 
or re-enacts them without change, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with 
prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and to have adopted 
them as consistent with its own intent."). The Legislature has been aware for many 
decades of how the courts apply the statutes of limitations, but has not mandated another 
approach. Olseth, 2007 UT 29, ]j 39. This means the district court simply applied the 
one-year statute of limitations the way the Legislature intended it to be applied. That is 
not legislating from the bench. 
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In sum, Bates' nominally non-defamation claims against Steinegal and Smalley are 
based on the same allegations he used to support his dismissed defamation claims. Under 
Jensen and a long history of controlling precedent, the district court properly dismissed 
those claims as barred by defamation's one-year statute of limitations. This Court should 
affirm. 
II. Bates' Remaining Claims Against Steinegal and Smalley Are Barred by 
Noerr-Pennington Immunity 
Bates' remaining claims are also barred by the Noerr--Pennington doctrine as set 
forth in the briefs of Appellees Utah Association of Realtors and Christopher Kyler and 
Appellees Michael Ostermiller, Sandra Hoover and Northern Wasatch Association of 
Realtors. Steinegal and Smalley hereby adopt and incorporate by reference those 
arguments and add the following observations specific to Bates' claims against them. 
As outlined above, all of the allegations against Steinegal and Smalley supporting 
Bates' remaining claims involve planning, instigating or continuing the UDRE 
administrative proceedings. There can be no dispute that the UDRE and the Real Estate 
Commission are governmental entities. Utah Code § 61-2-5(1) ("There is created within 
the Department of Commerce a Division of Real Estate"); id. § 61-2-5.5 ("There is 
created within the division a Real Estate Commission"). Therefore, Smalley and 
Steinegal's alleged planning, instigation or continuance of UDRE administrative 
proceedings against Bates amounts to petitioning the government for purposes of the First 
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Amendment and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Tellingly, none of Bates' examples of 
Appellees alleged "non-petitioning" conduct include Steinegal or Smalley. Brief of 
Applt. at 22-23. Steinegal and Smalley are undoubtedly immune from liability for their 
alleged conduct. Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^ 26, 116 P.3d 323 (noting 
that courts have extended Noerr-Pennington immunity to "protect. . . political activity 
against tort claims as well as antitrust claims." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Bates points out that criminal conduct like bribery should not be protected by 
Noerr-Pennington immunity. Brief of Applt. at 18-19 (citing Astoria Entm 't, Inc. v. 
DeBartolo, 12 So. 3d 956 (La. 2009)). But he never alleges that Smalley or Steinegal did 
anything illegal, much less criminal, or otherwise did something unprotected by the First 
Amendment. At most, he argues their conduct exceeded UDRE jurisdictional limits. 
Brief of Applt. at 19-20. Bates' illegal-conduct argument, even if it were correct, does 
not apply to Steinegal and Smalley. 
Similarly, Bates tries to argue that the Appellees' conduct was "non-political" 
under Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988), and 
therefore not protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity. Brief of Applt. at 24-27. But 
Allied Tube is a narrow decision that has no application to this case generally or 
Steinegal9s and Smalley's conduct specifically. 
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In Allied Tube, steel tubing interests conspired to have plastic electrical tubing 
excluded as an acceptable product in the Electrical Code, promulgated by the National 
Fire Protection Association. The Code is important because it is adopted virtually 
verbatim by many local governments and therefore dictates whether or not builders would 
purchase plastic tubing for use in building construction. The steel tubing interests 
successfully solicited people to attend the relevant Association meeting and vote against 
the plastic tubing's inclusion in the Code. After being sued by a plastic tubing 
manufacturer, the steel tubing interests claimed their conduct was protected under the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See generally Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495-499. 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument because "petitioner's actions took place 
within the context of the standard-setting process of a private association." Id. at 504. In 
other words, the defendant had never actually petitioned the government for anything. In 
particular, the Court noted that the Association, the entity the defendant had arguably 
petitioned, was composed of people "unaccountable to the public and without official 
authority." Id. at 501-502. Narrowing Allied Tube's scope even further, the Supreme 
Court expressly limited its holding "to cases where an 'economically interested party 
exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private 
association that comprises market participants.'" Id. at 510 n.13 (emphasis in original). 
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That is not what Bates alleges happened here, no matter how he now tries to 
contort his claims. He cannot turn the UDRE or the Real Estate 
Commission—statutorily created government entities—into an economically interested 
party creating product standards for a private association. Nor can he credibly argue that 
Commission members are not accountable to the public and lack official authority, Brief 
of Applt. at 26-27, when Utah law expressly outlines their official duties and authority 
and the process by which they are appointed by the governor and approved by the Senate. 
Utah Code § 61-2-5.5. Steinegal's and Smalley's alleged conduct relates only to the 
planning, commencement or continuance of government administrative proceedings 
against Bates to revoke his license. Noerr-Pennington immunity clearly applies. Allied 
Tube does not. 
Finally, Bates' claims do not fit within the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity. Just because the UDRE Petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction does 
not mean the proceedings were a sham. Bates admits that the administrative proceedings 
were genuinely intended to achieve a favorable outcome—revocation of Bates' license. 
[R. 298 \ 228, R. 315 1322, R. 318 If 334, R. 319 If 344, R. 323 If 367, R. 327 ffl[ 395, 
397]. For that reason alone, as a matter of law, the administrative proceedings were not a 
sham and Bates' claims are barred. Anderson Dev., 2005 UT 36, ffl[ 27-28. 
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For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the briefs of other Appellees 
addressing Noerr-Pennington, the Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of 
Bates' claims against Steinegal and Smalley under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
III. Steinegal and Smalley Join the Arguments Raised by Other Appellees 
Steinegal and Smalley hereby join and incorporate by reference the additional 
arguments presented in the briefs of the other Appellees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellees Mark Steinegal and Charles Smalley 
respectfully request the Court to affirm the dismissal of Bates' claims against them. The 
claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations and by Noerr-Pennington 
immunity and by the arguments raised in the briefs of the other Appellees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STANFORD E. (/URSER (13440) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
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